Corporate Governance and Economic Performance
Klaus Gugler, Assistant Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics Klaus Gugler
Oxford University Press, 2001 - Business & Economics - 223 pages
Corporate governance has time and again been the subject of extensive scrutiny and controversy. Much of the debate of the 1960s and 1970s focused on the managerial corporation in the USA and the UK, inspired by the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932). The separation of ownership fromcontrol has been blamed for spectacular business failures. While there is ample evidence about corporate governance and performance in the USA and the UK, very little is known about the functioning of corporate governance elsewhere."Corporate Governance and Economic Performance" presents evidence about corporate governance and performance in a large number of countries. It is the result of a collective research effort by the members of the European Corporate Governance Network (ECGN), which brought together 'country teams'familiar with the language and corporate culture of their respective countries. The volume focuses on Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While the 'owner--manager conflict' appears to dominate in the USA and theUK, the 'large--small shareholder' conflict is important in Continental Europe. Based on this evidence, the authors derive important policy implications for capital market reform in Europe.
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Beneficial blockholders versus entrenchment and rent
Takeovers and the market for corporate control
References for Part I
abnormal returns analyse assets Austria average bank—firm Becht Belgium block-holders board members board of directors board structure cash flow cent concentrated ownership corporate control Corporate Governance corporategovernance countries devices direct monitoring effects empirical employees Enrico Mattei equity European evidence executive expropriation Financial Economics firm performance funds German Goergen Gugler holders holding companies hostile takeovers incentives increase industrial institutional investors investment Italy Japan Japanese Journal of Financial keiretsu large shareholders listed companies listed firms main bank managerial compensation market for corporate mechanisms mergers minority shareholders negative Netherlands non-financial offirms OMV AG owners ownership and control ownership concentration ownership structure percent poison pills profitability proxy votes ratio relationship remuneration Renneboog reports role sample separation of ownership shares Shleifer significantly small shareholders stakes structured regime studies supervisory board takeover defences Telefonica Tobin's Q turnover variables voting power voting rights