Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting, Volumes 1-3
This major work, compiled by one of the leading academics in Europe in the area of corporate governance, brings together key readings in the field, focusing on those corporate governance mechanisms influencing financial reporting and accountability. Volume One: Overview of Corporate Governance and Theoretical Context: starts with a number of key papers on the theoretical origins of corporate governance, which are followed by a selection of articles surveying corporate governance generally and corporate governance and financial reporting specifically, to give readers a broad understand-ing of the field. Volume Two: Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting: comprises primarily empirical research findings on specific accounting issues, commencing with disclosure and transparency, going on to earnings management and concluding with sundry other financial reporting issues. Volume Three: Mechanisms of Governance Relevant to Financial Reporting: four mechanisms of governance are given particular attention - audit committees, internal audit, risk management and external audit. This is followed by two papers addressing broader issues of corporate governance and accountability.This major work concludes with some considerations of governance and accountability in the public sector and with the regulatory aspects of the topic.
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Managerial Behavior Agency Costs
Separation of Ownership and Control Eugene F Fama
11 other sections not shown
accounting standards activities agency costs agency problems analysis Andrei Shleifer assets audit committee bankruptcy banks behavior blockholders board composition board of directors bondholders Cadbury Cadbury Report capital cash flow companies contracts control rights corporate governance mechanisms corporate governance systems countries creditors debt decision control decision management earnings management effect empirical equity ownership evidence example executive compensation expansion path external auditors Financial Economics financial reporting financial statements firm performance firm value firm's free cash flow function ideology important incentives increase independent indifference curve inside inside directors institutional interest internal audit investment issues Jensen Journal of Accounting Journal of Financial large investors large shareholders legal protection literature managerial market value maximizing ment non-pecuniary benefits optimal organizations owner owner-manager ownership structure paper potential profit relation relationship residual claimants residual claims Review risk role share shareholders studies theory tion true and fair voting wealth Weisbach