Corporate Governance and Firm Organization: Microfoundations and Structural Forms
Oxford University Press, 2004 - Business & Economics - 397 pages
Recent scandals involving large firms, in the US and elsewhere, have intensified discussion regarding the role and conduct of the corporation. The contributors to this book argue that much of this debate has taken too narrow a view of the issue of corporate governance, and question some of the key assumptions of economic models.
Drawing on insights from a variety of fields, including management studies, organization studies, economics and finance, political science, sociology, psychology, and legal studies, the contributors argue that these models fail to take account of the varied and complex behaviour of actors within the corporation. Instead the cognitive and motivational foundations of governance problems and possible solutions are re-worked to produce a broader conception of governance, and a new range of forms that this can take. The book argues that no one of these forms is the 'solution' to the corporate governance problem.
The book contains chapters from leading international management scholars, including: Masahiko Aoki, Margaret Blair, John Child, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Bruno Frey, Anna Grandori, Joseph Lampel, Ryon Lancaster, William Lazonick, Siegwart Lindenberg, Patrick Moreton, Margit Osterloh, Michael Piore, Andrea Prencipe, Suzana Rodrigues, Mark Roe, Giuseppe Soda, Steen Thomsen, Brian Uzzi, Paul Windolf, and Todd Zenger.
Corporate Governance and Firm Organization provides an important contribution to the corporate governance debate, and will be essential reading for academics and graduate students of corporate governance, business and management, economics, finance, sociology, and law; Consultants, professionals, and policy-makers working in the area of corporate governance.
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