Corporate Governance: Accountability in the Marketplace
Dr Elaine Sternberg brings a philosopher's clarity to the debate on the nature of corporate governance. She presents a robust defence of the 'Anglo-Saxon' model, before comprehensively refuting so-called 'stakeholder theories' of corporate governance.
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Contents Foreword Professor Colin Robinson
The Traditional Anglo
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accountable to shareholders achieving the corporate AGMs Andrew Fisher Anglo-Saxon corporate governance Anglo-Saxon model argument assets audit auditors banks benefits business corporations Business Ethics CalPERS cent CGAIM Chapter company law company's corporate agents corporate elections corporate governance mechanisms corporate objectives corporate performance corporate purposes Deutsche Bank distributive justice economic effectively employees ensure evaluate example Financial financial audit firms function fund managers fundamental German and Japanese German companies groups hostile takeovers improve corporate governance institutional investors investment Japan Japanese models Japanese systems Jim Kelly legitimate long-term owner value Martin Lipton maximising long-term owner model of corporate Monks and Minnow non-executive directors ordinary decency organisations pension fund Professor protect pursuing refer regulation requires responsibility role shareholder activism shareholder democracy shareholder resolutions shareholder value shares short-termism sokaiya stakeholder doctrine stakeholder theory supervisory board system of corporate target traditional Anglo-Saxon system trust typically undermine vote