Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
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Don't waste your time with this read. Seth Jones has zero independent thought and parrots what others tell him. About the only thing he got right was his small paragraph noting that the border needs to be secured, but he fails to put the readily available hard evidence behind it in a scientific fashion. As such, even this idea was probably plagarized from one of his students at Georgetown University.
Chapter One Introduction
CHAPTER TWO Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare
CHAPTER THREE The Age of Insurgency
CHAPTER FOUR Insurgents and Their Support Network
CHAPTER FIVE Afghan Government and Security Forces
CHAPTER SIX US and Coalition Forces
CHAPTER SEVEN Recommendations
APPENDIX Insurgencies Since 1945
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