A Course in Game Theory
A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
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Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated
Knowledge and Equilibrium
Extensive Games with Perfect Information
Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games
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action profile agreement alternating offers assumption bargaining game Bayesian game best response chain-store coalitional game common knowledge constituent game core correlated equilibrium defined definition deviation equilibrium of G equilibrium outcome equilibrium strategy example EXERCISE extensive game finite folk theorem game form game in Figure game of alternating game theory game with perfect history h infinitely repeated game information function information set interpretation iterated elimination knows Lemma machine game mixed strategy equilibrium mixed strategy Nash Nash solution pair partition payoff function perfect information period player 1 chooses player 1's preference profile preference relation Prisoner's Dilemma Proof Proposition punishment pure strategy rational rationalizable result satisfies Section sequence sequential equilibrium set of actions Shapley value situation solution concept strategic form strategic game strategy Nash equilibrium strategy of player strategy profile strictly dominated subgame perfect equilibrium subset terminal histories tion transferable payoff trembling hand perfect weakly dominated actions