Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and Incentives
Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler, Domenico Siniscalco
Springer Science & Business Media, Jun 22, 1998 - Business & Economics - 314 pages
Is knowledge an economic good? Which are the characteristics of the institutions regulating the production and diffusion of knowledge? Cumulation of knowledge is a key determinant of economic growth, but only recently knowledge has moved to the core of economic analysis. Recent literature also gives profound insights into events like scientific progress, artistic and craft development which have been rarely addressed as socio-economic institutions, being the domain of sociologists and historians rather than economists. This volume adopts a multidisciplinary approach to bring knowledge in the focus of attention, as a key economic issue.
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3 Opening the Black Box of Innovation
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5 Research and Productivity
6 University Patenting Amid Changing Incentives for Commercialization
7 Communication Norms and the Collective Cognitive Performance of Invisible Colleges
8 Literacy and the Diffusion of Knowledge across Cultures and Times
9 Market Failures Education and Macroeconomics
10 How to Finance Education when the Labor Force is Heterogeneous?
From Academies to the Grand Tour
12 Oral Transmission in Indian Classical Music The Gharana System
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14 Foreign Investment as a Vehicle for International Technology Transfer
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Academy Accademia del Disegno aggregate allocation artists assume basic research Bayh-Dole Act behavior Blomstrom citations cognitive competition country f David developing countries diffusion direct investment distribution dynamic economic effects efficiency empirical endogenous entry equilibrium exports factor Figure finance firm's fixed costs function Gharana grade growth host countries human capital imperfections important incentives income increase individual industries innovation institutions interactions International invisible college joint ventures Khyal knowledge capital licensing linkages macroeconomic Markov random field MNC affiliates MNCs multinational firms national firms number of firms optimal output paper physical capital production property rights R&D activity R&D agreements random sample relative endowments role scientific sector share significant skilled labor skilled-labor social networks specific spillovers studies suppliers tacit knowledge technology transfer theory trade Trajtenberg university patents upgrading variable voter model workers X-sector
Page 236 - Minute Discrimination is Not Accidental. All Sublimity is founded on Minute Discrimination. I do not believe that Rafael taught Mich. Angelo, or that Mich. Angelo taught Rafael, any more than I believe that the Rose teaches the Lilly how to grow, or the Apple tree teaches the Pear tree how to bear Fruit.
Page 236 - Reynolds's Opinion was that Genius May be Taught & that all Pretence to Inspiration is a Lie & a Deceit, to say the least of it. For if it is a Deceit, the whole Bible is Madness. This Opinion originates in the Greeks' calling the Muses Daughters of Memory.
Page 11 - There is a story, repeated by a number of Roman writers, that a man — characteristically unnamed — invented unbreakable glass and demonstrated it to Tiberius in anticipation of a great reward. The emperor asked the inventor whether anyone shared his secret and was assured that there was no one else; whereupon his head was promptly removed, lest, said Tiberius, gold be reduced to the value of mud.