Curbing Clientelism in Argentina
Cambridge University Press, 6 ott 2014 - 195 pagine
In many young democracies, local politics remain a bastion of nondemocratic practices, from corruption to clientelism to abuse of power. In a context where these practices are widespread, will local politicians ever voluntarily abandon them? Focusing on the practice of clientelism in social policy in Argentina, this book argues that only the combination of a growing middle class and intense political competition leads local politicians to opt out of clientelism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, an original public opinion survey, and cross-municipal data in Argentina, this book illustrates how clientelism works and documents the electoral gains and costs of the practice. In doing so, it points to a possible subnational path towards greater accountability within democracy.
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Politician Behavior and Voter Beliefs
Why Some Politicians Opt Out
Clientelism Social Policy and Measurement
Clientelism across Municipalities in Argentinas
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Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy
Anteprima limitata - 2014
Argentina argue audience costs Auyero beneficiary list benefits Bolsa Familia Brazil Calvo and Murillo chapter cities citizens civil society clien clientelism treatment clientelist exchange coefficients conditional cash transfer context contrast corruption costs of clientelism decentralization democracy distribution effects El Carril elections electoral empirical evidence expected explain focus funded government performance high competition implementation increases incumbent indicator variable individual information about clientelism Kitschelt Latin America legislative opposition likelihood logistic regression Low poverty mayoral intervention mayoral involvement measure of clientelism Mexico middle class non-Peronist Nonetheless nonpoor voters ofthe partisan partisanship Peronist mayors Peronist party PNSA political behavior political competition political support politicians population practice predicted probability redistribution regression regression analysis rely on clientelism respondents role Salta sample social class social desirability bias social policy social safety net social welfare office social welfare provision statistically significant subnational survey experiment targeted theory vote intention voting behavior