Cyber Terrorism--a View from the Gilmore Commission: Hearing Before the Committee on Science, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, October 17, 2001, Volume 4

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U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002 - Computer networks - 81 pages
 

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Page 57 - Panel concludes that several reasons work against state sponsorship, including the prospect of significant reprisals by the United States against the state sponsor, the potential inability of the state sponsor to control its surrogate, and the prospect that the surrogate cannot be trusted, even to the point of using the weapon against its sponsor. The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for the entire spectrum of potential terrorist threats - both the unprecedented higher-consequence...
Page 51 - The panel shall1 . assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 2. assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 3.
Page 10 - Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission.
Page 2 - ... First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Page 51 - ... to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 3. assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions; 4. recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction...
Page 58 - The report explains, with some specificity, the challenges involved in each of the four device or agent topic areas—biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological-—which suggests that some public pronouncements and media depictions about the ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass destruction or inflict widespread casualties do not always reflect the significant hurdles currently confronting any nonstate entity seeking to employ such weapons. The report acknowledges, nevertheless,...
Page 64 - The next President should establish a National Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President, and should seek a statutory basis for this office.
Page 78 - ... provide required capabilities on scene: a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) for foreign incidents and a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST membership will be limited to those agencies required to respond to the specific incident. Both teams will include elements for specific types of incidents such as nuclear, biological or chemical threats. The Director...
Page 2 - The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall...
Page 58 - ... and foremost —minimize human casualties and also mitigate damage to property and to the environment. Part of the report focuses on the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway, which marked the first time that a nonstate group had used a chemical weapon against civilians. The conventional wisdom—that terrorists were not interested in killing, but rather in publicity, or were concerned about a loss of popular support or international...

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