Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar
Cyberspace, where information--and hence serious value--is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack.
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction
CHAPTER TWO A Conceptual Framework
CHAPTER THREE Why Cyberdeterrence Is Different
CHAPTER FOUR Why the Purpose of the Original CyberattackMatters
CHAPTER FIVE A Strategy of Response
CHAPTER SIX Strategic Cyberwar
CHAPTER SEVEN Operational Cyberwar
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