Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt ReschedulingCambridge University Press, 26 ապր, 1996 թ. - 613 էջ International debt rescheduling, both in earlier epochs and our present one, has been marked by a flurry of bargaining. In this process, significant variation has emerged over time and across cases in the extent to which debtors have undertaken economic adjustment, banks or bondholders have written down debts, and creditor governments and international organizations have intervened in negotiations. Debt Games develops and applies a situational theory of bargaining to analyze the adjustment undertaken by debtors and the concessions provided by lenders in international debt rescheduling. This approach has two components: a focus on each actor's individual situation, defined by its political and economic bargaining resources, and a complementary focus on changes in their position. The model proves successful in accounting for bargaining outcomes in eighty-four percent of the sixty-one cases, which include all instances of Peruvian and Mexican debt rescheduling over the last one hundred and seventy years as well as Argentine and Brazilian rescheduling between 1982 and 1994. |
Բովանդակություն
Examining the importance of epochs | 15 |
toward a model of debt | 44 |
A situational theory of payoffs and intervention | 61 |
A theory of situational change | 84 |
Peruvian debt | 138 |
Mexican debt rescheduling | 163 |
Mexican debt rescheduling | 237 |
Peruvian debt negotiations | 287 |
Mexican debt rescheduling | 333 |
Peruvian debt | 376 |
Argentine debt rescheduling in | 409 |
Brazilian debt rescheduling | 457 |
Findings and avenues for future research | 517 |
Appendix | 561 |
603 | |
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Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling Vinod K. Aggarwal Դիտել հնարավոր չէ - 1996 |
Common terms and phrases
actors Aggarwal agreement Argentina arrears August bankers banks bargaining bondholders bonds Brady Plan Brazil Brazilian British government Chile coalition Committee concern continued countries creditor governments crisis Deadlock debt game debt negotiations debt rescheduling debt servicing debtors debtors and lenders default domestic efforts epoch expected outcome exports February foreign debt funds game and predicted game theory guano high concessions ICBM increased interest payments interest rate International Debt Intervention Expected Lenders intervention underlined issue weak jumbo loan Latin American LAWR lending loan medium ment Mexican government Mexico million Nash equilibrium bolded negotiations and outcome normal form game Ordinal Payoff Matrix outcome with intervention overall capabilities overall weak period Peronist Peru Peru's Peruvian government pesos Play phase political stability President pressure Prisoner's Dilemma problems revenues secure settlement situational change strategy trade Turlington 1930 U.S. government Wall Street Journal World Bank Wynne York