Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers

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Cambridge University Press, Nov 13, 1999 - Political Science - 319 pages
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In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.
 

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Contents

1 PATHS OF POLICY MAKING
1
2 CHOOSING HOW TO DECIDE
14
3 TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
34
4 THE DECISION TO DELEGATE
52
5 DATA AND POSTWAR TRENDS
86
6DELEGATION AND CONGRESSIONALEXECUTIVE RELATIONS
121
7 DELEGATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
163
8 DELEGATION AND ISSUE AREAS
196
9 CONCLUSION
232
AN AFTERWORD ON COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONS
240
APPENDICES
245
References
301
Index
313
Cover
318
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