Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers
Cambridge University Press, Nov 13, 1999 - Political Science - 319 pages
In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.
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1 PATHS OF POLICY MAKING
2 CHOOSING HOW TO DECIDE
3 TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
4 THE DECISION TO DELEGATE
5 DATA AND POSTWAR TRENDS
6DELEGATION AND CONGRESSIONALEXECUTIVE RELATIONS
7 DELEGATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
8 DELEGATION AND ISSUE AREAS
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agency’s Agriculture Amendments analysis average discretion beneﬁts bicameralism bill Budget bureaucrats Chapter coded coefﬁcients committee outliers committee’s conﬂict Congress delegates congressional Congressional Quarterly congressional—executive constituents Constraint Ratio data set decision deﬁned delegated authority delegation ratio Democrats difﬁcult discretionary authority distributive divided government economic enacted executive agencies executive branch executive branch actors executive discretion expertise federal ﬁnd ﬁndings ﬁrms ﬁrst gridlock hold-up problem House hypothesis ideal point identiﬁed impact inﬂuence interbranch conﬂict issue areas laws legislative organization less line-item veto logrolls majority party majority-party Mayhew McCubbins measure median ﬂoor voter multiple referrals nondelegation doctrine number of hearings Ofﬁce oversight hearings partisan percent policy areas policy-making predictions preferences president presidential presidential systems reﬂect Republicans restrictive rules roll-call votes separate powers signiﬁcant Social Security speciﬁc summaries Table theory tion tive trade transaction cost analysis transaction cost politics uniﬁed government variable Weingast