Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy
Cambridge University Press, Sep 2, 2002 - Juvenile Nonfiction - 284 pages
The laws that legislatures adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. States, they argue that particular institutional forms--such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature--have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
LAWS BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION
RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS
STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING
A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION DISCRETION AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
LEGISLATION AGENCY POLICYMAKING AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
LAWS INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
Other editions - View all
administrative adopt agency argue argument behavior bicameral bill bureaucrats chambers Chapter coalition coded column committee common law compliance boundary constrain corporatism corporatist costs countries create delegation democracies Democrats dependent variable design of legislation detailed legislation discuss divided government Divided Legislature dummy variable effect empirical enrollment example executive exist expertise focus health plans HMOs ideal point incentives increases influence interacted issue legislative capacity legislative majorities legislative statutes legislative veto Legislature x Compensation low-discretion law low-discretion statute measure Medicaid ment Michigan minority government MMC program nonstatutory factors number of words optimal Parliamentary model parliamentary systems participants party policy categories policy conflict policy details policy implementation policy instructions policy language policy outcomes policymaking process political control political systems politicians presidential systems Republicans role scholars separation of powers sexual harassment specific policy tests text blocks theory tion total number types U.S. Congress Unified Legislature Veto model