Deontic Morality and Control

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Cambridge University Press, Jul 18, 2002 - Philosophy
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This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified.
 

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Contents

1 Introduction
1
Part One Determinism and Deontic Morality
11
Part Two Indeterminism and Deonti Morality
85
Part Three Consequences of Being Deprived of Deontic Anchors
149
Notes
252
Glossary and List o Principles
269
References
272
Index
283
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