Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism
The basis of nuclear doctrine during the Cold War was deterrence.Nuclear powers were deterred from attacking each other by the fear of retaliation. Today, much of the concern over possible nuclear attack comes in the context of rogue states and terrorism. And since only states are known to possess nuclear weapons, an important question is how to deter them from letting terrorists acquire a device, whether through an authorized transfer or a security breach.Michael A. Levi analyzes this aspect of deterrence in the post-Cold War world, as well as what to do if deterrence breaks down. He suggests how to discourage states from giving weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists and how to encourage states to bolster security against any accidental transfer. The report also discusses the role of nuclear attribution-the science of identifying the origin of nuclear materials-in deterring transfers, an essential link in assigning responsibility to governments for transfers of nuclear materials.Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism offers thoughtful analysis and practical guidelines for U.S. policy on a complex and important question and makes an important contribution to the thinking in an underexplored but unavoidable area of the post-Cold War security debate.
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2007 A Maurice ability to attribute acquires nuclear weapons aftermath approach authorized and unauthorized authorized transfer Center for Geoeconomic Center for Preventive Cold War deterrence Council on Foreign Council Special Reports credible CSRNo Darfur deliberate transfers deterrent threats Deterring State Sponsorship efforts explosive material Geoeconomic Studies Report Greenberg Center Improving Attribution Iran Iranian Islamabad Jay Davis lear Levi materials to North materials to terrorist Michael missiles North Korean leaders North Korean nuclear nuclear attack Nuclear Terrorism nuclear terrorist attack nuclear transfer plutonium policymakers possibility post-detonation Preventive Action Report Pyongyang regime change retaliate following retaliatory rule out retaliation Russia and Pakistan September 2008 Sponsorship of Nuclear strategists strong targets terrorist groups theft threat to retaliate tion traditional deterrence transfer nuclear weapons transfers of nuclear U.S. attribution capabilities U.S. capabilities U.S. Policy U.S. president U.S. threat United weapons and materials weapons materials weapons or materials weapons or weapons Yongbyon