Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings
Alex Byrne, Heather Logue
MIT Press, 2009 - Philosophy - 334 pages
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctivetheory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed thata veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and asubjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivistschallenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the correspondinghallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenlyremoves it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change,disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different.Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism.This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react todisjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first topropose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of importantobjections.
Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M.Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar,Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon
The hardcover edition does not includea dust jacket.
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1 Visual Experiences
2 Selections from Experiences
3 Perception Vision and Causation
4 The Objects of Perceptual Experience
5 Selections from Criteria Defeasibility and Knowledge
6 The Reality of Appearances
7 Arguments from Illusion
8 The Idea of Experience
9 Selections from Perception