Economic Analysis of Accident Law

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Harvard University Press, Jun 30, 2009 - Law - 320 pages
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Accident law, if properly designed, is capable of reducing the incidence of mishaps by making people act more cautiously. Scholarly writing on this branch of law traditionally has been concerned with examining the law for consistency with felt notions of right and duty. Since the 1960s, however, a group of legal scholars and economists have focused on identifying the effects of accident law on people's behavior. Steven Shavell's book is the definitive synthesis of research to date in this new field.
 

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Contents

Introduction
1
Organization of the Book
3
Liability and Deterrence Basic Theory
5
Unilateral Accidents
6
Bilateral Accidents
9
Unilateral Accidents
21
Bilateral Accidents
26
Mathematical Appendix
32
72 Injurers Inability to Pay for Losses
167
73 Vicarious Liability
170
74 Limited Liability of Shareholders for Losses Caused by Corporations
175
Mathematical Appendix
177
The Allocation of Risk and the Theory of Insurance
186
82 The Theory of Insurance
192
Mathematical Appendix
199
Liability Riskbearing and Insurance Basic Theory
206

Liability of Firms
47
31 The Case Where Victims Are Strangers to Firms
48
32 The Case Where Victims Are Customers of Firms
51
Mathematical Appendix
64
Factors Bearing on the Determination of Negligence
73
42 Prior Precautions
77
43 Uncertainty Error and Misperception
79
44 Implications of Findings of Negligence
83
Mathematical Appendix
86
Causation and the Scope of Liability
105
52 Coincidental Accidents
110
53 Uncertainty over Causation
115
Mathematical Appendix
118
The Magnitude of Liability Damages
127
62 The Probability of Losses
128
63 Courts Uncertainty about the Level of Losses
131
64 Pecuniary versus Nonpecuniary Losses
133
65 Economic Losses
135
66 Particularistic Elements in the Computation of Liability
140
67 Victims Opportunities to Mitigate Losses
144
68 Liability in Excess of Losses
146
Mathematical Appendix
151
Other Topics in Liability
164
92 The Accident Problem in the Absence of Liability
208
94 The Accident Problem Given Liability and Insurance
210
Mathematical Appendix
215
Liability Riskbearing and Insurance Extensions to the Basic Theory
228
102 Awards Optimal for Compensation versus Awards Optimal for Deterrence
231
103 Victims Collateral Insurance Benefits and Injurers Liability
235
104 Injurers Inability to Pay and Liability Insurance
240
105 Structure of a System of Pure Accident Insurance
243
Mathematical Appendix
245
Liability and Administrative Costs
262
112 The Private Motive to Make Claims versus Their Social Desirability
265
Mathematical Appendix
270
Liability versus Other Approaches to the Control of Risk
277
122 Factors Bearing on the Appeal of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Approaches
279
123 Factors Bearing on the Desirability of Privately Initiated versus StateInitiated Approaches
283
124 Factors Bearing on the Appeal of Nonmonetary Criminal Sanctions
284
125 Concluding Observations
285
Mathematical Appendix
286
Critical Comments
291
Purpose and Future of Accident Liability
297
References
299
Index
307
Copyright

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About the author (2009)

Steven Shavell is Samuel R. Rosenthal Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.

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