Economic Analysis of Settlements
GRIN Verlag, 2009 - 76 pages
Seminar paper from the year 2007 in the subject Law - Miscellaneous, grade: 1,0, University of Augsburg, course: Seminar zur okonomischen Analyse des Rechts, 29 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: This paper discusses settlements in German civil proceedings. It begins by introducing some empiric data regarding the general behaviour in Germany in which to solve legal disputes. Then, it provides an overview of legal possibilities and requirements for settlement and/or not to go to trial, and briefly compares the German approach with those of other countries. The essay's purpose, however, is to look at the economic efficiency of settlements. Using an economic analysis of law and the principal tool now being employed in this area - the game theory -, this paper gives economic reasons and conditions for individuals to determine whether and how to settle disputes. Additionally, in order to explain the observed behaviour, the paper takes a detailed look at Germany and the average German attitude on how to solve legal disputes. For this reason, it discusses abstract reasons for the observed behaviour and other than the theoretical ones.
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15a EGZPO alternative dispute resolution Analyse des Rechts Analyse zentraler Rechtsinstitute analysis of law Analysis of settlements arguing parties aspects Außergerichtliche obligatorische Streitschlichtung basic example BaySchlG BB-Beilage Nr.10 Bewußtsein seiner Bürger Bundesbürger Civil Procedure Law Code of Civil court costs Daughety economic analysis efficient than litigation Encyclopedia of Law Entlastung der Justiz equals D’s expected expected payoff Fallrepetitorium game theory game-theoretical German civil German judicial system German legislator’s go to court go to trial Greger Grundgesetz inefficient Intermediate Microeconomics judge judicial branch Kirstein Law and Economics lawsuit Leeb legal disputes legal relationship likelihood mainly Ökonomische Analyse zentraler opportunity costs outcome P’s expected payment payoff what s)he perfect information players Polinsky/Shavell popular in Germany possibilities to settle procedural condition proceedings Rechtsstaat im Bewußtsein regarding settlements regarding the social relevant actors Schnapp Sendler settlement is economically SIEPR Discussion Paper social welfare Stadler Varian Wassermann Zur„Prozessfreude