Economics of Contract Law
Douglas G. Baird
Edward Elgar, Jan 1, 2007 - Law - 656 pages
'This book will serve as the essential resource for anyone interested in the economic analysis of contract law. Baird has included both the iconic articles of the past and the recent works which define the cutting edge of scholarship in the area. This volume is that rare collection that offers a snapshot of the current academic learning across the field. It is both an invaluable resource for those first exploring the economic analysis of contract law as well as a useful reference for the initiated.' - Robert Rasmussen, Vanderbilt University, US This important volume presents a rich collection of ideas on and insights into the law and economics of contracts. It includes material relevant to a large number of legal fields. Many of the articles are classics that have, over the years, become focal points for continuing debate; others provide an easily accessible account of particular areas. the editor's comprehensive introduction provides an overview of law and economics scholarship in contracts over the past few decades and a portal into an evolving field.
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Alan Schwartz allocation Analysis of Contract argued argument assume assumption background rules bargaining behavior benefits Breach of Contract buyer and seller choose Cj(r common law compensation compensation principle contract law courts Craswell damage measures damage rule default rule detrimental reliance disclosure discussion doctrine Econ Economic Analysis efficient breach Enforcing Promises entrant ex post example expectation damages expectation measure Fried Hadley incentive incomplete contracts induce inefficient investment JOURNAL OF LEGAL law and economics Law Journal Vol legal rules LEGAL STUDIES level of reliance liability liquidated damages loss mistake negotiations nonreciprocal promises obligation offer optimal outcome Pareto efficient payoff plaintiff Posner principle production promisee promisee's promisor promissory estoppel Proposition purchase reason reliance damages reliance level reliance measure remedy renegotiation requires result risk sanctions Section Shavell social special widget specific performance supra note theory tion trade transaction costs valuation Yale Law Journal