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Winter 1989 Number
Analysis of the HoldUp Game Daniel A Graham
Renegotiation and Specific Performance Tracy R Lewis
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accept Aghion agreement analysis asset bargaining Barry Wright buyer choose commercial consumer contract law contract modifications Corp court costs defendant deficiency judgments demand disclosure discovery Duke University duress Econ economic effect efficient breach enforce entrant entrepreneur equilibrium exclusive firm foreclosure governance structure Grinnell hold-up game incentive initial contract inventory investment know-how level of reliance licensor liquidated damages litigation maximize moral hazard Nash Equilibrium opportunity cost optimal original seller outcome parties patent licenses payment physician plaintiff positive probability possible potential pre-existing duty rule private information product failure profit protection purchase realization rejects reliance actions reliance expenditures reliance level renegotiation replacement warranty result risk royalty sequential equilibrium SH(j Shavell snubbers specific performance stipulated damages Supp supplier supra note territorial restrictions trade secret license transaction trial tying arrangement Uniform Commercial Code United