Efficiency, Equilibrium, and a Theory of Syndicates with Differential Information |
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Contents
FORMULATION | 12 |
CHARACTERIZATION OF CONDITIONALLY EFFICIENT CONTRACTS | 35 |
CONSTRAINED COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA | 63 |
Copyright | |
8 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
Arg Max Assume Chapter claims contingent coalition C's collection of coalitions concept conditional core conditional efficiency conditional expectation conditionally blocked conditionally efficient contract conjugate function constrained competitive equilibrium convex convex set counter-proposal defined definition denote density differential information economy equilibrium allocation equilibrium price equilibrium price vector event example exists expected utility exponential utility finite follows full-communication equilibrium given grand coalition Hence implies initial endowment iteration Lemma linear market process mechanism nonempty Pareto-efficiency payoff-relevant parameter precision h prevailing price vector prior probability prior probability distribution private information probability assessments profit distribution rule Proof Proposition random variable rational-expectations equilibria realized risk sharing risk tolerance risk-cautiousness satisfies sharing rule state-contingent claims strict inequality subset Suppose surrogate syndicate syndicate's wealth Takao Kobayashi Theorem trade cycle trader utility functions Walrasian equilibrium weakly conditionally efficient wealth endowment weft
Bibliographic information
| Title | Efficiency, Equilibrium, and a Theory of Syndicates with Differential Information |
| Author | Takao Kobayashi |
| Publisher | Stanford University, 1977 |
| Length | 312 pages |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |