Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value

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Cambridge University Press, Aug 16, 2007 - Philosophy - 272 pages
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How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm rejects the standard philosophical answers to these questions, which presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation, and develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons.
 

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Contents

1 Two problems of practical reason
1
PART I FELT EVALUATIONS
27
PART II PRACTICAL REASON
123

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About the author (2007)

Bennett Helm is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Franklin and Marshall College.

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