Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.
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adopted agent path agent pursues agent’s incentives agent’s strategy Column completely reduced incentive conceming concrete game condition of rational conﬂict decision principle decision problem deﬁnition ﬁnite number game theory given relentlessness given the proﬁle ideal agents ideal games incentive to switch initiate a terminating insufﬁcient jointly rational Matching Pennies maximize expected utility mixed strategies Nash equilibrium necessary condition number of agents objective solutions option partial version partially reduced incentive path of incentives path of relative path terminates payoff increases payoff matrix prescience principle of dominance principle of ratiﬁcation principle of self-support proﬁle of strategies proﬁle realized pure strategies pursue incentives pursuit of incentives rational choice rational strategies reason to switch reduced incentive structure relative incentives relentless pursuit response proﬁle Row’s self-supporting strategies speciﬁcation standard of Nash stopping rule strategic equilibrium strategic reasoning strictly dominated sufﬁcient incentive sufﬁcient reason supposition switch strategy tenninating terminating path tree version of Matching