## Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining and no transaction costs is Walrasian |

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agent of type agent's action Ariel Rubinstein Ariel Ruhinstein assumed Avner Shaked bargaining game bargaining process behaviour characteristics space competitive equilibrium Costs is Walrasian definition of equilibrium definition of strategy Discontinuous Economic Games distribution of types Douglas Gale endowments of agent entrants Equilibrium in Discontinuous equilibrium strategy Eric Maskin Existence of Equilibrium expected utility Hart John Sutton Joseph Stiglitz Ken Binmore leave the market Let f Market with Sequential matching process meeting is described metric space Monopolistic Competition monotonic Nash bargaining solution Nash Bargaining Theory Nash Equilibria Natural Oligopolies non-cooperative Oliver optimality outcome Partha Dasgupta perfect equilibrium population of agents PROOF proposer Proposition published in Economic Rafael Repullo random endowments reach agreement response function Rubinstein satisfies Assumption School of Economics sequence of random Sequential Bargaining set is denoted Shaked & John stationary distribution stationary strategies strategy f theorem transaction costs types of agents unit surplus utility function