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The Effect of Firm Performance on Average Employees
Appendix A Appendices for Chapter 1
Appendix B Appendix for Chapter 2
0-worker ability workers adverse selection annual data item Assets on Log asymmetric information Book Ratio coefficients compensation methods competitive Compustat annual data constraint data sets earnings per share Economics employees equilibrium concept equilibrium refinement evidence expected compensation expected output expected payoff expected profits firm performance firm variables firm within person firm's firms offer fully separating high-ability workers incentive increase indifference curve larger for pay-for-performance Lazear Lemma Log Assets Log Curre1t Assets Log Wages low-ability workers market to book monitoring costs moral hazard NLSY occupation Pareto efficient pay-for pay-for-performance contract pay-for-performance sensitivity pay-for-performance workers Perfect Bayesian equilibrium pooling equilibrium predictions Proof relative risk aversion risk aversion semi-separating PBE separating equilibrium signaling game signalling sub-game sta1dard errors Stage Stiglitz Stock-Market Return straight salary contract straight salary firm Total Labor Market types unique equilibrium unobserved variance of wages Washington State data withi1 perso1