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action argument arising asso belief Bishop Berkeley body capable capacity for sensation causation cause and effect ceived ception cerning changes colour compound conceive conscious considered conti continue to exist contradiction course of nature Deity Destutt de Tracy doctrine dreams efficient cause ence equal erist essence evidence evist experience extension external objects figure formed Hume Hume's ideas and sensations images imagination immediately impressions insentient instinct irregular calls jects knowledge lities manner matter means memory mind miracles namely nature neces necessary notion observation organs of sense ourselves outward objects pendant perceived perception philosophy powers present primary qualities proof proportions prove ready to appear reason Reid relation of cause relation of ideas renders respect result rience rieties sation sensation in particular sensible qua sensible qualities sentient simple sensations Stewart supposed take notice things thought tion ture understanding union unknown unper variety whilst whole word
Page 96 - ... it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without, resembling them. Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas : since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, in the same order we see them in at present, without their concurrence.
Page 207 - ... it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them, excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct...
Page 212 - When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view ; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
Page 88 - We ought to examine apart those two questions which are commonly confounded together, viz., why we attribute a continued existence to objects even when they are not present to the senses, and why we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception.
Page 273 - God is able to create Particles of Matter of several Sizes and Figures, and in several Proportions to Space, and perhaps of different Densities and Forces, and thereby to vary the Laws of Nature, and make Worlds of several sorts in several Parts of the Universe.
Page 308 - The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not derived from any connection which we perceive a priori between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them.
Page 94 - Suppose — what no one can deny possible — an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing?
Page 307 - I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures...
Page 277 - All mathematical demonstration is built upon the notion, that where quantities or diagrams resemble each other, the relations which are true with respect to one of each kind, will be true with respect to all others of a like kind ; only because there is nothing to make a difference among them. So, if in all past time such
Page 212 - Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.