Evolutionary models in laboratory and auditing games
University of Michigan, 1992 - Business & Economics - 272 pages
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adjustment dynamic adjustment heuristic allocations analysis of game analysis predicts anchoring and adjustment APPENDIX Assume assumption audit risk auditee's gradient auditor auditor's data Bayesian analysis behavior best reply blank trials Chapter COHORT OF EXPERIMENT column players Column subjects common knowledge convergence to equilibrium detection risk determined deviation Diagram divergence dominated dynamical system eigenvalues equation Equilibrium Not Equilibrium equilibrium strategies evolutionary analysis evolutionary game theory evolutionary model Feedback Cohorts fixed point Game 2A goes to zero HIDDEN ACTION GAME hidden action model inherent risk laboratory games matched mixed strategy myopia Nash equilibrium negative normal form game opponent opponent's oscillations p-value t-statistic paired Panel payoff gradients performance reports periods of play phase portrait player chooses Pprev previous round q(t+l regression replicator dynamics Row and Column Row subjects SECTION Selten's simulation standard trials strategic auditing strict analysis Subject 2 chooses SYMMETRIC COHORTS TABLE UCF Cohort Uncontrolled Feedback utility functions value of h