Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors
R.M. Isaac, Douglas D. Davis
Emerald Group Publishing, Apr 21, 2006 - Social Science - 260 pages
This volume consists of nine papers that use experimental and theoretical tools to examine issues pertaining to charitable auctions and fundraising. In recent years, the revenue-generating effects of different fundraising techniques have been a subject of increasing policy interest as private, religious and state originations have come to rely increasingly on fundraising activities for revenues. Experimental methods provide an ideal context for conducting the dialogue between economists, fundraisers and policymakers regarding the revenue and social consequences of alternative fundraising methods. Themes explored in the volume include the structure of charity auctions, charity lotteries, fund drives as well as some of broader issues underlying charitable behaviour. It explores the structure of different fundraising and charitable programs. It is a valuable resource for economists, fundraisers and policymakers interested in the consequences of their fundraising efforts.
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COMPARISONS OF AUCTIONS WITH PRICEPREFERENCE VALUES
SEALED BID VARIATIONS ON THE SILENT AUCTION
AUCTIONS VERSUS LOTTERIES
THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
MULTIPLE PUBLIC GOODS AND LOTTERY FUND RAISING
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL COMPARISONS ON NONPROFIT FUND RAISING
DO DONORS CARE ABOUT SUBSIDY TYPE? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
IDENTIFYING ALTRUISM IN THE LABORATORY
THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF A PUBLIC GOOD WITH BINDING MULTIROUND COMMITMENTS
agents aggregate all-pay auction altruism amount Andreoni ascending auctions baseline behavior charitable lotteries charity choice coefﬁcient Conjecture contribution levels control experiments decision deﬁned Dictator game difference Divide 40 points donation donors earnings effects efﬁciency endowment English auction revenues estimates example Experimental Economics ﬁeld experiment ﬁnal ﬁnd ﬁnding ﬁrst ﬁrst-price auctions ﬁve fund-raising group account group allocations h ¼ Hold ______ increase individual lab dollars lottery bids lottery revenues Mark Isaac matching subsidy MPCR MRC experiments Nash equilibrium number of points observed optimal paper participants Pass ______ pass rates payoff period player prize provides public goods game rafﬂe rebate subsidy receive reﬂect risk aversion risk posture risk preference round sales format sealed bid auctions second-price auction signiﬁcantly silent auctions social comparison speciﬁc statistically signiﬁcant subjects Table ticket purchases Tobit model value set voluntary contributions winning zero