Extreme games and their solutions |
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according affine set functions assume bonds canonical representation classes coalition forming process conditions of Theorem consider core define Economics equations extreme games extreme in $1 extreme point extreme superadditive f G E0 f is extreme follows G Q1 game theory given Hence holds true homl homogeneous implies inequalities Lemma Let v G linear m(AK main simple solution marginal measure max max max v(R maximal minimal representation Moreover mS(S natural numbers nondegeneracy Obviously problem production function production game production process Proof properties representation theory represented rescaling S G Q S+i+j satisfied Seiten sequence Shapley value skillful players solution concept stable set Step superadditive games superadditive point functions Suppose symmetric game Theorem 2.3 trivial uniform distribution unique units of money utility v(Si vector weighted majority xU’V doms zero sum
Bibliographic information
| Title | Extreme games and their solutions Volume 145 of Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems Mathematical economics |
| Author | Joachim Rosenmüller |
| Publisher | SpringerVerlag, 1977 |
| Original from | the University of California |
| Digitized | Aug 25, 2011 |
| ISBN | 0387082441, 9780387082448 |
| Length | 126 pages |
| Subjects | › Game theory Mathematics / Game Theory |
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