Fairness and Efficiency in the Competition Between For-profit and Nonprofit Firms
Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, 1988 - Nonprofit organizations - 20 pages
Many recent proposals seek to restrict the commercial activities of nonprofit firms. I examine some neglected fairness and efficiency aspects of these proposals. Specifically, I propound a new symmetry-type standard for the fairness of the competitive process per se, and note efficiency tradeoffs in a second best world.
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Bertrand equilibrium Burton Weisbrod Business Income Tax capital commercial activities competitors corporate income tax corporate tax cost curve costs due deduction differential tax discussed distortions due to differential duopoly earnings economies of scope elimination entry example excess exit extending the UBIT Fairness and Efficiency fairness of tax for-profit firm FP competing FP firm FP hospital free rider problem horizontal equity argument industry inefficiencies Institution for Social Jerald Schiff marginal cost Martin Feldstein NPs exempt purpose NPs receive obtain Office of Tax owners of FP pharmaceutical division playing field Policy Studies Yale PONPO Working Paper profits proposals reaction functions related income Schiff and Weisbrod Small Business Administration Social and Policy Subcommittee on Oversight Susan Rose-Ackerman Swain tax advantage Tax Analysis Tax Notes July tax reform tax subsidies tax-exempt status taxable taxation trade places U.S. Dept Unfair Competition unfairly unpublished draft unrelated activities Unrelated Business Income Weisbrod 1988 ob.cit