Federal Trade Commission, Divestiture: Hearing Before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Subcommittee for Consumers
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980 - Corporate divestiture - 131 pages
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able action activity administrative agency alleged amendment American antitrust laws appeals appropriate authority believe cease and desist Chairman Clayton Act Commission's Committee companies competition competitors complaint concentration concerned conduct Congress considered consumer continued corporations created dealing decision Department of Justice divestiture economic effective enforcement example existing fact Federal Trade Commission firms force FTC Act FTC's giant going Government hearings important independent industry intended involved issue judge kind Kodak legislative licensing major matter monopoly monopoly power order divestiture pending percent petroleum Pitofsky position practices present problem profits proposed protect question reason record regulation regulatory remedy Report require respondents result role seems Senator Ford Senator Heflin share Sherman Act small business staff statement statute structural relief Subcommittee Supreme Court tion unfair United violation
Page 69 - Upon the direction of the President or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to any alleged violations of the antitrust Acts by any corporation.
Page 113 - Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 US 1, 31 S.Ct.
Page 9 - In this type of case we start from the premise that an injunction against future violations is not adequate to protect the public interest. If all that was done was to forbid a repetition of the illegal conduct, those who had unlawfully built their empires could preserve them intact. They could retain the full dividends of their monopolistic practices and profit from the unlawful restraints of trade which they had inflicted on competitors. Such a course would make enforcement of the act a futile...
Page 12 - Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.
Page 7 - January 1, 1948 ... the Sherman Act ... the Clayton Act, and the . . . Federal Trade Commission Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
Page 108 - Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 186-199 (1975) (testimony of John W.
Page 115 - To forbid the doing in the future of acts like those which we have found to have been done in the past which would be violative of the statute. Second — The exertion of such measure of relief as will effectually dissolve the combination found to exist in violation of the statute, and thus neutralize the extensive and continually operating force which the possession of the power unlawfully obtained has brought and will continue to bring about.
Page 123 - United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v.
Page 115 - It would be a novel, not to say absurd, interpretation of the Anti-trust Act to hold that after an unlawful combination is formed and has acquired the power which it had no right to acquire, namely, to restrain commerce by suppressing competition, and is proceeding to use it and execute the purpose for which the combination was formed, it must be left in possession of the power that it has acquired, with full freedom to exercise it.