Financial Crises: Understanding the Postwar U.S. Experience
This book is a path-breaking survey and critique of the major theories of financial crises. It builds a model of crisis from an analysis of postwar financial crises in the United States through the mid-1980's. It has gained interest as a supplemental text.
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Theories of Financial Crises
Comparison of Theories of Financial Crises
Financial Crises in the Postwar US Economy
The Credit Crunch of 1966
197O Penn Central
1974 Franklin National
The Legacy of 1982
Understanding the Postwar Experience
A BusinessCycle Model of Financial Crises
Evaluating the Theories of Financial Crises
Changes in Financial Crises The Role of LongTerm Trends and Institutional Change
The Silver Crisis of 198O
The 1982 Crisis
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addition annual rate assets bank credit bank failures bank loans banking system bankruptcy Board of Governors borrowing business cycle business loans business-cycle expansion business-cycle model capital Chapter commercial banks commercial paper corporate sector credit crunch crisis decline in profits deposit insurance depositors developments difficulties discount window disruption dollar Drysdale economy Eurodollar Federal Reserve Board Federal Reserve System financial condition financial crises financial markets financial system financing gap fourth quarter fragility Franklin Friedman growth Hunts Ibid increased interest coverage ratio interest rates internal funds inventory investors lender liabilities loan demand Marx million Milton Friedman Minsky Minsky's Mitchell model of financial monetary policy money supply nonfinancial corporations peak Penn Square Penn Square Bank percent percentage plant and equipment postwar period pressure problems purchased funds recession REITs repurchase agreements S&Ls Seafirst second quarter sharply short-term silver Sinai surprise event theory of financial tighten Veblen Wojnilower
Page 1 - ... amount; and in times of ordinary prosperity, therefore, it is commonly advantageous to employ credit in the way indicated. Still more so in brisk times, when opportunities for earnings are many and promise to increase. To turn the proposition about, so as to show the run of business motives in the case: whenever the capable business manager sees an appreciable difference between the cost of a given credit extension and the gross increase of gains to be got by its use, he will seek to extend his...