Flexibility and European Unification: The Logic of Differentiated Integration
After the stagnation that beset the European Communities in the 1970s, European unification has made decisive advances between the mid-1980s and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004. At the same time, legal differentiation ("flexibility") has allowed initially reluctant member states to opt out of new obligations in a variety of important areas, including monetary integration, defense policy, and justice and home affairs. This book disentangles the important, fascinating, and complex relationship between flexibility and European unification. Alkuin Kolliker builds upon public goods theory to uncover the logic of differentiated European integration. The result, differentiated integration theory, explains why flexible integration among the most willing EU members eventually attracts reluctant countries in some cases, but not in others-as well as why it is sometimes not even used in the first place. Empirical case studies are drawn from all the main pillars of EU activities, taking into account instances of differentiation within and outside EU law, as well as of differentiated arrangements within and beyond EU borders. Flexibility and European Unification provides the first theory-based, comprehensive, and empirically sound account of European integration from the perspective of legal differentiation."
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Discovering the Logic of Flexible Integration
Differentiation in the EU and Its Unsolved Puzzles
Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Differentiation
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actors Amsterdam Treaty applied Article borders centrifugal effects closer cooperation club common pool resource context core CPR problems deadlock defense policies Denmark differentiated arrangements differentiated integration theory Dublin Convention EC Treaty economic empirical evidence enlargement establishment Euro Europe European integration European Union eventual participation excludable network explain fixed exchange rate flexible arrangements flexible integration framework governments Hypothesis initially reluctant countries initially unwilling countries initially unwilling member institutions international common pool involve issue areas issue linkage join level of integration Maastricht Treaty monetary integration negative external negative external effects Nice Treaty non-excludable non-members non-participants number of participants outcome participation of initially policy areas political pool resource problems positive internal effects potential public goods theory referred regulatory competition remains respect rivalry in consumption Schengen Agreement Schengen Information System security policy single market snake specific subsection tax harmonization theoretically expected tion unity veto