Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, July 24, 2000
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000 - Carnivore (Computer file) - 112 pages
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ability able activity actually additional agencies allow application authority Bachus believe Canady Carnivore cause Chairman collect communications concerns conduct Congress Constitution court order crime criminal Department developed device dialed e-mail effect electronic communications electronic surveillance example existing expectation fact Federal filter Fourth Amendment give going hearing important individuals install interception interest Internet Service Provider issue Justice Kerr law enforcement limited look mean messages monitor Nadler obtain operating packet particular pen register person probable problem proposals protect question raises reasonable record Report simply standard statement statute technical telephone testimony Thank thing tion tool traffic trap and trace understand users wiretap
Page 75 - shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device" where a law enforcement officer certifies that the "information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.
Page 62 - Under the current standards, a judge "shall" approve any request signed by a prosecutor certifying that "the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18 USC §§3122-23. This is low standard of proof, similar to that for a subpoena, and judges are given
Page 82 - shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device" where a law enforcement officer certifies that the "information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.
Page 78 - By failing to acknowledge that technology permitted the government to intrude on communications in a way that previously was impossible, a five-vote majority concluded that the Fourth Amendment "does not forbid what was done here because "[t]he United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone messages as of mailed sealed letters.
Page 83 - ECPA defines a trap and trace device as "a device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.
Page 79 - replacing the previous focus on the means of communication with an appreciation of the fact of communication as the source of constitutional rights. It concluded that "| t|he Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied.
Page 75 - [n]either the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 US 159, 167 (1977).
Page 112 - In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to wellrecognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.
Page 54 - to balance three key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications services and technologies.