Framers' Construction/Beardian Deconstruction: Essays on the Constitutional Design of 1787Annotation New York, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt/M., Oxford, Wien. Major Concepts in Politics and Political Theory. Vol. 18 General Editor: Garrett Ward Sheldon. Was the constitutional design of 1787 prompted by the desire of the Founding Fathers to protect their economic interests, as alleged by Charles Beard in his pathbreaking study in 1913, or was it perhaps attributable to the Framers' determination to overcome democratic turbulence in the states, as posited by the currently academically fashionable neo-Beardian school of historical interpretation? Neither thesis, Professor Slonim demonstrates, accords with the documentary record of the Constitutional Convention. Rather, the tension between the overarching need to create an effective national government and the desire to preserve state autonomy shaped the final result at Philadelphia. What emerged was a strong central government within a federal framework. Also analyzed in this volume are several neglected provisions and features of the 1787 constitutional design and their present-day implications. 'Professor Slonim, a seasoned and trenchant analytical observer of the U.S. Constitution, has provided a major contribution to investigative scholarship with his splendid tome. His rejection of the Beardian and neo-Beardian interpretation of the basic document demonstrates that, in fine, the Framers were wise political scientists.' (Henry J. Abraham, James Hart Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Emeritus, University of Virginia) 'I know of no American historian steeped as deeply and intelligently in the formation of the U.S. Constitution as S. Slonim, the distinguished Israeli scholar. This collection of Professor Slonim's superbessays on the Founding Era confirms his status as a remarkable independent thinker. I view this book as a must read for everyone interested in constitution-making in the United States and other nations. Slonim's emphasis on federal-state relations as the central theme of. |
Contents
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Beards Historiography and the Constitutional | 52 |
Gordon Woods | 94 |
Copyright | |
5 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
adoption agst amendment American Antifederalists appointment Articles of Confederation authority branch candidates Charles Beard Charles Pinckney choice cited clause Committee of Detail compromise Congress Connecticut Compromise Constitutional Convention corruption danger debate declared delegates democracy democratic discussion draft Economic Interpretation Edmund Randolph Elbridge Gerry Electoral College Emphasis in original executive Extrajudicial Farrand favor federal government federal powers Federalist foreign influence Founding Fathers Framers George Mason Gerry Gouverneur Morris Govt House of Representatives Ibid interests Jefferson Jersey Plan joint ballot judges judiciary legislative veto lower house Madison majority mode of electing national government national legislative veto national legislature negative noted personalty Philadelphia Pinckney political popular election President principle proposal provision Randolph Records reflected remarks republican requirement role Senate separation of powers Slonim smaller South Carolina suggestion Supreme Court term treaties treaty-making two-thirds Union United upper house Virginia Plan vote Washington Wood Wood's