Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist
Though written by an economist, this book's subject is not "economics" in the ordinary sense of that term. Instead, it is James Buchanan's contribution to what he has called the "contractarian revival," the renewed interest in and emphasis on the metaphor of the social contract in evaluating political alternatives. He believes that genuine constitutional dialogue must take place in this country if America is to remain a free society and that the perspectives of an economist are valuable in the discussion of basic issues of social philosophy.
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A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy
Law and the Invisible Hand
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academic liberal accept action agreement allow alternative analysis anarchy apple growers applied argument attitude basic becomes behavior Calculus of Consent cedar choice collectivization conception constitutional constitutionalist constraints contract contractarian criteria critical defined democratic dilemma discussion distribution economic economists efficiency emerge enforcement equal equilibrium ethical rule evaluation example exchange existing fiscal freedom game theory genuine Gordon Tullock Hayek Hobbesian implied imposed income individual initial institutions interaction interpreted John Rawls legislative libertarian anarchist limits maximization ment moral law nonoptimal norms Nozick observed optimal original position outcome paradigm Pareto criterion Pareto optimality Pareto region persons player political Posner's possible potential precepts predicted principle question rational Rawls Rawls's Rawlsian recognize reform relatively relevant Robert Nozick samaritan seems sense situation social contract social order social welfare function society specific structure suggest Theory of Justice tion utility welfare welfare economics Wicksellian