From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United Statesmajor work by one of Japan's leading naval historians, this book traces Alfred Thayer Mahan's influence on Japan's rise as a sea power after the publication of his classic study, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Hailed by the British Admiralty, Theodore Roosevelt, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the international bestseller also was endorsed by the Japanese Naval Ministry, who took it as a clarion call to enhance their own sea power. That power, of course, was eventually used against the United States. Sadao Asada opens his book with a discussion of Mahan's sea power doctrine and demonstrates how Mahan's ideas led the Imperial Japanese Navy to view itself as a hypothetical enemy of the Americans. Drawing on previously unused Japanese records from the three naval conferences of the 1920s--the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Geneva Conference of 1927, and the London Conference of 1930--the author examines the strategic dilemma facing the Japanese navy during the 1920s and 1930s against the background of advancing weapon technology and increasing doubt about the relevance of battleships. He also analyzes the decisions that led to war with the United States--namely, the 1936 withdrawal from naval treaties, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, and the armed advance into south Indochina in July 1941--in the context of bureaucratic struggles between the army and navy to gain supremacy. He concludes that the "ghost" of Mahan hung over the Japanese naval leaders as they prepared for war against the United State and made decisions based on miscalculations about American and Japanese strengths and American intentions. |
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LibraryThing Review
User Review - Shrike58 - LibraryThingThe main topic of this book is strategic culture, as Asada examines how Alfred Thayer Mahan’s vision of the complementary nature of trade and strategic naval power influenced the Imperial Japanese ... Read full review
Contents
1888 | |
From Enrnity to Détente | |
COMPROMISE AND REACTION | |
Men Organization and Strategic Visions 193141 | |
Abrogation of the Washington Treaty and After | |
The Japanese Navy and the Tripartite Pact | |
The Southward Advance and the American Embargo | |
Other editions - View all
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Sadao Asada No preview available - 2013 |
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Sadao Asada No preview available - 2006 |
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70 percent ratio Akiyama Akiyama Saneyuki American Anglo-American powers armaments army attack battleships Britain Captain China Combined Fleet Commander compromise confidential cruisers decision demand Diary East embargo emperor fight fleet fleet faction Harada-Saionji Hawaii Hori Hughes hypothetical enemy Ibid Imperial influence Inoue Shigeyoshi Ishikawa Japan Japanese navy Japanese-American JMFA kaigi Kaigun Kanji Kat6 Kato Tomosaburo Kato’s Kobayashi Kobayashi Seizo London treaty Mahan Mahanian military Ministry Nagano national defense Naval Affairs Bureau naval conference Naval General Staff naval leaders naval limitation Naval Staff College naval treaty navy minister navy vice minister navy’s negotiations nikki Nomura Oikawa Okada Osumi Pearl Harbor Philippines political Prince Fushimi Rear Admiral Roosevelt Saito Sat6 Sato sea power Senshibu Senshishitsu senso Shidehara Shimada strategy submarine Suetsugu Takarabe telegram Tokyo Tomosaburo Tripartite Pact TSM-S United Vice Admiral vice chief Wakatsuki War Plan Orange Washington Conference Washington treaty western Pacific wrote Yamamoto Yamamoto Isoroku Yamanashi Yonai