From a deflationary point of view
"Deflationism" has emerged as one of the most significant developments in contemporary philosophy. It is best known as a story about truth -- roughly, that the traditional search for its underlying nature is misconceived, since there can be no such thing. However, the scope of deflationism extends well beyond that particular topic. For, in the first place, such a view of truth substantially affects what we should say about neighboring concepts such as "reality," "meaning," and "rationality." And in the second place, the anti-theoretical meta-philosophy that lies behind that view -- the idea that philosophical problems are characteristically based on confusion and should therefore be dissolved rather than solved -- may fruitfully be applied throughout the subject, in epistemology, ethics, the philosophy of science, metaphysics, and so on.
The essays reprinted here were written over the last twenty five years. They represent Paul Horwich's development of the deflationary perspective and demonstrate its considerable power and fertility. They concern a broad array of philosophical problems: the nature of truth, realism vs. anti-realism, the creation of meaning, epistemic rationality, the conceptual role of "ought," probabilistic models of scientific reasoning, the autonomy of art, the passage of time, and the trajectory of Wittgenstein's philosophy. They appear as originally published except for the correction of obvious mistakes, the interpolation of clarifying material, and the inclusion of new footnotes to indicate Horwich's subsequent directions of thought.
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Three Forms of Realism 1982
Realism and Truth 1996
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abductive inference aesthetic Allan Gibbard alternative anti-realism anti-realist argue argument assumption characterization claims conception of truth confirmation Consequently constitutes definition deflationary deflationism degrees of belief distinction domain Dummett electrons empirically equivalent epistemological Essay example explain express expressivism expressivist facts false formulation Fraassen Gibbard Hartry Field Hilary Putnam hypothesis idea inference instrumentalists justified Kripke Kripke's language logical meaning merely meta-philosophy metaphysical realism norm-expressivism normative notion of truth numbers objective observation Oxford philosophical philosophy of science plausible position possible potential notational variants practice predicate priori probability calculus problem proposition Putnam question rational raven raven paradox reason redundancy theory reference rules of inference scepticism schema scientific sea-battle semantic realism sentences simply snow is white statements suppose Tarski's theoretical theory of truth therapeutic Bayesianism thesis tion total theories Tractatus true iff truth-conditions underdetermination underlying nature University Press use-theory verificationism verificationist W. V. Quine Wittgenstein word