From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982

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Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984 - Europe - 129 pages
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Page 68 - ... on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy. Destruction of the opposing force is achieved by throwing the enemy off balance with powerful initial blows from unexpected directions and then following up rapidly to prevent his recovery. . . . Army units will . . . attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective. They will maintain the agility necessary to shift forces and fires to the points of enemy...
Page 103 - Air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
Page 104 - Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.
Page 6 - The United States could find itself in a short, intense war — the outcome of which may be dictated by the results of initial combat. This circumstance is unprecedented : we are an Army historically unprepared for its first battle. We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population brought to bear after the onset of hostilities. Today the US Army must, above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war.
Page 45 - The concept emphasizes the all too frequently ignored or misunderstood lesson of history — that once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win something — else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations cannot be simply to avert defeat — but rather it must be to win.
Page 70 - When we speak of destroying the enemy's forces we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered.
Page 39 - Such contingencies could occur in a variety of militarily demanding environments, from deserts to mountainous regions to tropical rain forests. The requirement for flexibility is apparent. The Challenge. The most demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 1980s is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe, without compromising the decisive theater in Central Europe.
Page 70 - characterized by rapid shifts in the main effort to take advantage of opportunities by momentum and by the deepest, most rapid, and simultaneous destruction of enemy defenses possible.
Page 90 - ... of what is to be done, where it is to be done, when it is to be done, who is to do it, and how. At the second session, Edward C. Heintz, assistant librarian of Bowdoin College, presented a paper entitled "War Training in a Large Industry and Its Application to Public Library Management...
Page 9 - Yet the commander should attack "only if he expects the outcome to result in decisively greater enemy losses than his own, or result in the capture of objectives crucial to the outcome of the larger battle.

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