Game Theory for Wireless Engineers
Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2006 - Technology & Engineering - 76 pages
The application of mathematical analysis to wireless networks has met with limited success, due to the complexity of mobility and traffic models, coupled with the dynamic topology and the unpredictability of link quality that characterize such networks. The ability to model individual, independent decision makers whose actions potentially affect all other decision makers makes game theory particularly attractive to analyze the performance of ad hoc networks.
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12 WHERE DID GAME THEORY COME FROM?
13 WHY IS GAME THEORY RELEVANT TO WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING?
14 HOW CAN I USE GAME THEORY PROPERLY?
15 INTRODUCTION TO EXAMPLES
153 Trust Management
342 Discussion of Nash Equilibrium
362 Flow Control
Repeated and Markov Games
411 Extensive Form Representation
412 Equilibria in Repeated Games
413 Repeated Games in Strategic Form
A Repeated Game Example
Decision Making and Utility Theory
22 EXISTENCE OF ORDINAL UTILITY REPRESENTATIONS
221 Finite X
222 Countable X
224 Uniqueness of Utility Functions
23 PREFERENCES OVER LOTTERIES
231 The von NeumannMorgenstern Axioms
232 Von NeumannMorgenstern and the Existence of Cardinal Utility Representations
24 OTHER VISIONS OF EXPECTED UTILITY REPRESENTATIONS
Strategic Form Games
32 DOMINATED STRATEGIES AND ITERATIVE DELETION OF DOMINATED STRATEGIES
33 MIXED STRATEGIES
34 NASH EQUILIBRIUM
341 Dealing with Mixed Strategies
415 The Folk Theorems
GENERALIZING THE REPEATED GAME IDEA
432 Medium Access Control
Convergence to Equilibrium Potential Games
52 POTENTIAL GAMES
612 Cognitive Radios and Learning
614 Mechanism Design
Other editions - View all
action profile application of game Archimedean axiom best response binary relation change strategies chapter choose cognitive radio communications and networking concept consider convergence convex cooperation countable cr_i define Definition deletion of dominated denote discuss dominated strategies exact potential game example existence expected utility representation extensive form games finite set fixed point folk theorems game F game in strategic game theory hoc networks improvement path iterative deletion lottery Markov games maximize mixed strategies Nash equilibrium nodes optimization ordinal potential game ordinal utility outcomes play player potential function power control power level preference relation preference relationship probability distributions problem proof pure strategies repeated game represents resource sharing round single stage game SINR strategic form game strategy profiles strategy space subgame perfect equilibrium theorem throughput uncountable unilaterally deviating upper hemicontinuous user's users utility function video with probability weak topology wireless communications wireless networks wireless systems
Page 71 - CU Saraydar. NB Mandayam. and DJ Goodman. "Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks," IEEE Transactions at Communications, vol.
Page 72 - Optimal routing control: Game theoretic approach," in Proceedings of the 36th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 3, 1997, pp. 2910-2915.doi:full_text  T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, "How bad is selfish routing?
Page 72 - Y Korilis. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. "Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies.
Page 72 - On using reputations in ad hoc networks to counter malicious nodes," in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems, July 2004, pp. 665—672.  J. Liu and V. Issarny, "Enhanced reputation mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks," in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Trust Management, April 2004.