Give Growth and Macroeconomic Stability in Russia a Chance: Harden Budgets by Eliminating Nonpayments
In Russia, implicit subsidies amounting to 10 percent of GDP per year in the form of nonpayments have stifled growth, contributed to the August 1998 macroeconomic crisis through their impact on public debt, and made at best a questionable contribution to equity. Hardening budgets requires that these nonpayments - or mutual arrears and noncash settlements among the government, the energy monopolies, and manufacturing firms - be eliminated with energy bills, taxes and budgetary spending settled on time and in cash.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
30 percent August 1998 meltdown average annual domestic Belka billion borrowing budget subsidies cash collections cash tax payments credibility disinflation dismantle nonpayments Drebentsov and Morozov EBFs EBRD electricity generation sector energy companies energy monopolies energy sector enlarged budget enterprise restructuring explicit and implicit federal government finance firms fiscal deficits fixing the exchange Gazprom and RAO growth hard budget constraints impact implicit subsidy providers industries after barter inflated prices insistence on cash inter-industry receivables Kornai macroeconomic macroeconomic policies manufacturing March 2000 March noncash settlements nonpayments system OECD offset operations overdue receivables Paul Seabright percent of GDP personal enrichment Poland power utilities privatization public debt RAO UES real appreciation real devaluation real exchange rate real interest rate receivables of Gazprom receivables of RAO revenues Russia shortfall soft budget constraints spending arrears stock of overdue subsidies to enterprises Table A-l tax arrears tax offsets Total Transition Economies virtual economy World Bank 1999