Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939
This book offers a reassessment of the international monetary problems that led to the global economic crisis of the 1930s. It explores the connections between the gold standard--the framework regulating international monetary affairs until 1931--and the Great Depression that broke out in 1929. Eichengreen shows how economic policies, in conjunction with the imbalances created by World War I, gave rise to the global crisis of the 1930s. He demonstrates that the gold standard fundamentally constrained the economic policies that were pursued and that it was largely responsible for creating the unstable economic environment on which those policies acted. The book also provides a valuable perspective on the economic policies of the post-World War II period and their consequences.
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abroad additional adjustment American Argentina Austria balance of payments balance‐of‐payments Bank of England Bank of France banking system Belgium borrowing Britain British budget deficit capital central bank credibility crisis currency depreciation debt decline deflation demand depreciated currencies Depression devaluation discount rate dollar domestic credit economic effects Eichengreen Europe European exchange control exchange rate exchange‐rate expansionary exports Federal Reserve System fell fiscal French Germany gold bloc gold convertibility gold reserves gold standard gold standard system hyperinflation imports income increase inflation inflationary inflows instability interest rates international cooperation international monetary interwar investment investors issue League of Nations levels liquidity loans London long‐term million monetary policy money supply Netherlands officials open market open market operations operation percent policymakers political pressure prewar problem purchases raised recovery reduced Reichsbank reparations reserve banks response restore revenues rise Roosevelt rose short‐term stability sterling Sweden trade United University Press wages World York