Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right
Little over a decade ago, infrastructure concessions promised to solve Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit. Awarded in competitive auctions, these concessions were supposed to combine private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. Yet something did not go quite right, as concessions were plagued with opportunistic renegotiations, most of them at the expense of taxpayers. Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions is a major contribution toward understanding what went wrong and what should be done differently in the future to reap the potential benefits of infrastructure reform and private participation in infrastructure provision. It begins by analyzing a rich data set on more than 1,000 infrastructure concessions, uncovering a series of puzzling stylized facts. It then considers alternative explanations for the patterns it has uncovered, and concludes with a series of insightful policy proposals aimed at avoiding common mistakes, enabling concessions to efficiently contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.
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Page 169 - dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, and
Page 45 - WATER SERVICES IN BUENOS AIRES. In May 1999 the province of Buenos Aires (Argentina) used competitive bidding to award a concession for the private provision of water services. Of the seven firms that prequalified for the operation, four submitted bids. The award criterion was the highest (lump-sum) transfer fee to the government of the province. The
Page 110 - in clearly defined circumstances, such as changes in the rates or calculation of specific taxes and allowed costs and should not cover the normal commercial risks of providing the service such as changes in the cost of labor or operational inputs.
Page 180 - percent level. b. Significant at the 10 percent level. c. Significant at the 5 percent level.
Page 12 - in any of the following areas: tariffs, investment plans and levels, exclusivity rights, guarantees, lump-sum payments or annual fees, coverage targets, service standards, and concession periods.
Page 45 - abandoned the concession, and the government reassumed responsibility for providing water services. The case was left in the hands of the courts, with
Page 80 - tariffs, investment plans and levels, exclusivity rights, guarantees, lump-sum payments or annual fees, coverage targets, service standards, and concession periods.
Page 101 - the salient choices for concession award criteria, based on efficiency, incentives, and effectiveness against renegotiation, should be either an annuity
Page 45 - and the government accused each other of noncompliance with agreed-upon terms. The government did not concede to a renegotiation,