Harm-less Lawsuits?: What's Wrong with Consumer Class Actions
Harm-Less Lawsuits? describes the origins of consumer class actions and analyzes their theoretical and practical problems. It concludes that a viable reform agenda must focus not solely on courts and common law tort but rather on the statutory laws that give rise to those actions. To protect against the massive risk of excessive enforcement and deterrence, the private enforcement of consumer protection laws should be closely tied to traditional common law requirements of detrimental reliance and loss causation.
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The Consumer Law of the Horse
Efficient Consumer Class Actions?
HI Consumer Classes in Action
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advertising AEI Press American Enterprise Institute argue Avery bargaining body of law buyer California Chairman and CEO claimants class members class-action common common-law requirements conduct Consumer Class Actions consumer law consumer transactions consumer-law consumer-protection statutes context corporate courts damages David Rosenberg defendants demand deterrence award detrimental reliance Director doctrines economics scholars efficient enacted example federal Federal Trade Commission fraud Fried and Rosenberg Greve harm-less class actions harm-less lawsuits harms incentives injury judge Kasky law and economics Law Review lawyers legislatures losses mandatory class actions Marlboro Lights Michael misrepresentation opportunistic optimal deterrence OxyContin parties Pepperdine University perspective Philip Morris plaintiff class Policy Studies political preclude Price private enforcement private litigation problems product-liability Professor Proposition 64 public-law purchasers reform regime Resident Fellow Resident Scholar Rezulin risk scholarship Senior Fellow social statutory sumer theory tort reform transaction costs Unfair Competition Law unharmed University verdicts Visiting Scholar Warner-Lambert