Harvard Law Review, Volume 29
Harvard Law Review Pub. Association, 1916 - Electronic journals
The Harvard Law Review is a student-run journal of legal scholarship. It is intended to be an effective research tool for practicing lawyers and students of the law. The Review publishes articles by professors, judges, and practitioners and solicits reviews of important recent books from recognized experts.
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action allowed appeal applied authority Bank become brought called carried cause claim common common law consideration considered constitutional contract corporation course court creditors damages decision defendant discussion distinction doctrine duty effect employer equity evidence existence fact Federal follow give given ground hand HARV held hold important injury interest involved judges judgment jurisdiction jury Justice land legislation less liability limited Mass matter means nature necessary negligence notice object opinion owner parties partnership person plaintiff possession possible practical present principle protect question reached reason recover refused regard relation result rule seems separate statement statute supra taken theory thing tion tort trespass trial trust United wages York
Page 815 - We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there, anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Page 509 - In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.
Page 561 - A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.
Page 804 - That no contract for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandise, for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the same...
Page 700 - I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.
Page 509 - It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe.
Page 214 - Every estate granted or devised to two or more persons in their own right shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy ; but every estate, vested in executors or trustees as such, shall be held by them in joint tenancy.
Page 321 - The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his legal representative, as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Page 652 - It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Page 706 - In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him. ... If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins.