High-Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for Oversight Is Needed
DIANE Publishing, 2010 - 104 pages
U.S. laboratories working with dangerous biological pathogens (commonly referred to as high-containment laboratories) have proliferated in recent years. As a result, the public is concerned about the oversight of these laboratories. The deliberate or accidental release of biological pathogens can have disastrous consequences. This report determines: (1) to what extent, and in what areas, the number of high-containment laboratories has increased in the U.S.; (2) which federal agency is responsible for tracking this expansion and determining the associated aggregate risks; and (3) lessons learned from highly publicized incidents at these laboratories and actions taken by the regulatory agencies. Charts and tables.
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