How Capitalistic is the Constitution?
American Enterprise Institute, 1982 - Business & Economics - 172 pages
Second in a three-part series designed to help prepare the nation for a thoughtful observance of the Constitutional bicentennial, this publication contains seven essays on the topic of capitalism and the Constitution. "American Democracy and the Acquisitive Spirit" (Marc F. Plattner) supports the argument that the framers of the Constitution established an essentially capitalistic government. "Class Rule under the Constitution" (Edward S. Greenberg) analyzes how the Constitution has adjusted to changing circumstances and forms of capitalism. "The Constitution and Hamiltonian Capitalism" (Forrest McDonald) argues that the Constitution was not originally designed to establish capitalism but that constitutional government and capitalism became intertwined at the outset. "The Constitution, Capitalism, and the Need for Rationalized Regulation" (Walter Dean Burnham) looks at the nature of the link between the structure and functioning of the American political regime and the corresponding economic structure. In "The Constitution and the Protection of Capitalism" (Bernard H. Siegan), it is argued that the current judicial policy fails to substantially secure material liberties and runs contrary to the original intent of the Constitution. "Capitalism or Democracy" (Robert Lekachman) examines the conflict between political equality and economic opportunity. "The Constitution and the Spirit of Commerce" (Stephen Miller) looks at the "Federalist Papers" to interpret contemporary politics. (LP)
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