Idea and Essence in the Philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza

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Columbia University Press, 1918 - 86 pages
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Page 18 - That the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head. That as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the sentient.
Page 54 - ... nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules.
Page 16 - There is a great difference between imagining, ie having some idea, and conceiving with the mind, ie inferring, as the result of a train of reasoning, that something 'is, or exists. But M. Descartes has not explained to us the sense in which they differ. The ancient peripatetics also have taught clearly enough that substance is not perceived by the senses, but is known as a result of reasoning. But what shall we now say...
Page 13 - For by sense, we commonly understand the judgment we make of objects by their phantasms; namely, by comparing and distinguishing those phantasms; which we could never do, if that motion in the organ, by which the phantasm is made, did not remain there for some time, and make the same phantasm return. Wherefore sense, as I here understand it, and which is commonly so called, hath necessarily some memory adhering to it, by which former and later phantasms may be compared together, and distinguished...
Page 44 - But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (Prop.
Page 49 - ... knowledge may be acquired, it is before all things necessary to distinguish between the understanding and the imagination, or between ideas which are true and the rest, such as the fictitious, the false, the doubtful, and absolutely all which depend solely on the memory. For the understanding of these matters, as far as the method requires...
Page 10 - He does not 4oin in Bacon's protest against the scholastic, habit of anticipating nature, of deducing facts from theories; he has no thought of substituting a scientific induction for the deductive rationalism of scholastic philosophy. So far as the question of method is concerned, he is the opponent rather of Bacon than of the schoolmen; for him, science, as such, is rationalistic or deductive, not empirical and inductive. Rational insight, not empirical knowledge, is his scientific ideal.
Page 12 - All which qualities, called sensible, are in the object, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion.
Page 10 - ... inductive. So Hobbes is regarded by many historians of philosophy as in direct opposition to Bacon both in method and in the ends he seeks. Balz,19 for example, quotes with approval Seth's judgment that Hobbes's quarrel with scholasticism concerns the subject-matter, not the method, of that philosophy. He does not join in Bacon's protest against the scholastic habit of anticipating nature, u "At Paris he was an intimate of Mersenne . . . center of a scientific circle that included Descartes and...
Page 52 - I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.

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