Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member CountriesCivil wars are among the most difficult problems in world politics. While mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping have produced some positive results in helping to end civil wars, they fall short in preventing them in the first place. In Incentivizing Peace, Jaroslav Tir and Johannes Karreth show that considering civil wars from a developmental perspective presents opportunities to prevent the escalation of nascent armed conflicts into full-scale civil wars. The authors demonstrate that highly-structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs such as the World Bank, IMF, or regional development banks) are particularly well-positioned to engage in civil war prevention. When such IGOs have been actively engaged in nations on the edge, their potent economic tools have helped to steer rebel-government interactions away from escalation and toward peaceful settlement. Incentivizing Peace provides enlightening case evidence that IGO participation is a key to better predicting, and thus preventing, the outbreak of civil war. |
Contents
1 Introduction | 1 |
2 Managing Civil Wars from the Perspective of Their Development | 14 |
3 The Interplay Between Civil War Development and Highly Structured Intergovernmental Organizations | 40 |
4 The Empirical Record of Highly Structured Intergovernmental Organizations and Armed Conflict Escalation | 71 |
Conceptual and Methodological Implications | 97 |
Conflict Trajectories in Indonesia Ivory Coast and Syria | 147 |
7 Conclusion | 194 |
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Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil ... Jaroslav Tir,Johannes Karreth No preview available - 2018 |
Common terms and phrases
actors analysis Arab League argument armed conflict escalation benefits capita logged Chapter civil war prevention commanding substantial resources conflict management conflict prevention conflict to civil Cote d'Ivoire credible commitment problem crisis domestic armed conflicts domestic conflict East Timor economic ECOWAS empirical model escalation of low-level escalation risk escalation to civil escalation to full-scale estimates European Union excluded population logged Fearon and Laitin fighting full-fledged civil full-scale civil Gbagbo GDP per capita Gleditsch government’s governments and rebels highly structured IGOs HSIGOs impact of highly incentives Indonesia influence of highly institutions International Monetary Fund involvement Ivory Coast Laurent Gbagbo low-level armed conflict mediation and intervention member countries memberships in highly military number of highly organizations Ouattara package version peace deal peacekeeping Percent excluded population Percent mountainous terrain Polity IV score probability of escalation probit Regan role of highly Salehyan Sambanis sanctions Settlements past Syria Timorese variable World Bank