Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries
Civil wars are among the most difficult problems in world politics. While mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping have produced some positive results in helping to end civil wars, they fall short in preventing them in the first place. In Incentivizing Peace, Jaroslav Tir and Johannes Karreth show that considering civil wars from a developmental perspective presents opportunities to prevent the escalation of nascent armed conflicts into full-scale civil wars. The authors demonstrate that highly-structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs such as the World Bank, IMF, or regional development banks) are particularly well-positioned to engage in civil war prevention. When such IGOs have been actively engaged in nations on the edge, their potent economic tools have helped to steer rebel-government interactions away from escalation and toward peaceful settlement. Incentivizing Peace provides enlightening case evidence that IGO participation is a key to better predicting, and thus preventing, the outbreak of civil war.
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List of Figures
List of Tables
2 Managing Civil Wars from the Perspective of Their Development
3 The Interplay Between Civil War Development and Highly Structured Intergovernmental Organizations
4 The Empirical Record of Highly Structured Intergovernmental Organizations and Armed Conflict Escalation
Conceptual and Methodological Implications
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actors analysis Arab League argument armed conflict escalation benefits capita logged Chapter civil war prevention commanding substantial resources conflict management conflict prevention Conict Resolution costs Cote d’Ivoire country’s credible commitment problem crisis domestic conflict East Timor economic ECOWAS empirical model escalation of low-level escalation risk escalation to civil escalation to full-scale estimates ethnic European Union fighting full-fledged civil full-scale civil Gbagbo GDP per capita Gleditsch government’s governments and rebels highly structured IGOs HSIGOs impact of highly incentives Indonesia influence of highly institutions International Monetary Fund involvement Ivory Coast Laurent Gbagbo low-level armed conflict mediation and intervention member countries memberships in highly military mountainous terrain logged Nossiter number of highly Ouattara peace deal peacekeeping Percent excluded population Percent mountainous terrain Polity IV score potential probability of escalation probit Regan Reuters role of highly Salehyan Sambanis sanctions Settlements past Syria third-party Timorese United Nations variable World Bank