Industrial Organization: A Strategic ApproachThrough an effective blend of analysis and examples this text integrates the game theory revolution with the traditional understanding of imperfectly competitive markets. The book's focus is on strategic competition and how firms can shelter their market power and economic profits from competitors. This focus establishes the intellectual foundation for determining business practices that warrant antitrust examination and prohibition and underlines recent activist antitrust policy. The author's stress an integrated understanding of industrial organization and the development of students' analytical abilities. |
Contents
Introduction | 3 |
Entry Deterrence | 14 |
The Welfare Economics of Market Power | 19 |
Copyright | |
30 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach Jeffrey R. Church,Roger Ware No preview available - 2000 |
Common terms and phrases
airlines antitrust assets assume average cost behavior Bertrand Bertrand game best-response function brand buyers capacity Chapter cheating collusive agreement competitors consider consumer surplus contract Cournot equilibrium decrease demand curve determine discount factor dominant firm downstream durable economic profits economies of scale effect efficient elasticity of demand entrant equal equilibrium price estimate Figure firm 1's firm's fixed costs free-entry greater incentive increase incumbent indifference curves Industrial Organization input supplier investment Journal of Economics Lerner index manager marginal cost marginal revenue market power market share maximize monopolistic competition monopoly profits Nash equilibrium number of firms oligopoly optimal outcome output P₁ payoff play player price discrimination product differentiation profit-maximizing punishment quantity quasi-rents rate of return reduce requires residual demand result rivals sell seller SPNE strategies subgame substitute supply Suppose Theory total surplus transportation costs two-part tariff unit variable vertical willingness to pay zero